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Problem area 
Helicopters are involved in too 
many unnecessary (avoidable) 
accidents. International initiatives, 
such as the International Helicopter 
Safety Team (IHST) and the 
European Helicopter Safety Team 
(EHEST), have been set up with the 
objective to achieve 80 percent 
fewer helicopter accidents by the 
year 2016, as compared to 2006 
levels. EHEST addresses the broad 
spectrum of helicopter operations 
across Europe, from Commercial 
Air Transport to General Aviation, 
and flight training activities. In the 
Netherlands, there is about one civil 
helicopter accident per year, which 
sometimes results in fatalities, and 
also this trend is fairly constant. 
 
Description of work 
In order to improve and promote 
helicopter safety, mainly in the 
Netherlands, the National 
Aerospace Laboratory NLR plays 
an active role. 
• NLR is a member in the 
international helicopter safety 
initiatives. NLR has initiated 
the annual Dutch helicopter 
safety days, thereby providing a 
platform for stakeholders to 
share their knowledge and 
experiences. 
• A third party risk model was 
developed to assess the risk of 
helicopter operations in the 
vicinity of heliports. 
• NLR’s Air Transport Safety 
Institute develops and applies 
knowledge and tools to help 
sustain and improve air 
transport safety. Helicopter 
safety related research focuses 
on flight operational safety 
assessments and safety data 
analysis. 
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• Aviation incidents and 
accidents, which in many cases 
are attributable to combinations 
of mechanical defects and 
human errors are analysed by 
experts from a variety of 
disciplines. 
 
Results and conclusions 
NLR, being the main knowledge 
enterprise for aerospace technology 
in the Netherlands, aims to render 
aviation safer and more sustainable 
and efficient. NLR combines multi-
disciplinary knowledge and a 
variety of tools, thereby enabling 
safety-related research. 
 
Applicability 
NLR can perform helicopter safety 
related work and research in a 
multi-disciplinary way. 
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Summary 
Each year helicopters are involved in too many unnecessary (avoidable) accidents. 
Consequently, various international initiatives, such as the International Helicopter Safety Team 
(IHST) and the European Helicopter Safety Team (EHEST), have been set up to help reverse 
this (relatively constant) safety trend. The IHST and EHEST objective is to achieve 80 percent 
fewer helicopter accidents by the year 2016, as compared to 2006 levels. EHEST brings 
together helicopter and component manufacturers, operators, regulators, helicopter and pilots 
associations, research institutes, accident investigation boards and some military operators from 
across Europe. In total the initiative counts around 50 organisations and 130 participants, of 
which around 70 are actively involved in the analysis and implementation work. EHEST 
addresses the broad spectrum of helicopter operations across Europe, from Commercial Air 
Transport to General Aviation, and flight training activities. 
In the Netherlands, there is approximately one civil helicopter accident per year, which 
sometimes results in fatalities. The National Aerospace Laboratory (NLR) is the key centre of 
expertise for aerospace technology in the Netherlands. NLR, as participant in EHEST, has 
mapped the causes of helicopter (un)safety. The point has now been reached however to devise 
and implement recommendations, such as technical solutions that make flying safer. In order to 
improve and promote helicopter safety in the Netherlands, NLR has initiated the so-called 
annual Dutch helicopter safety days. 
To enable measuring and ensuring helicopter safety, one needs a quantification of risk levels 
that residents living near heliports will be subjected to. In the case of fixed wing aircraft those 
risks have been accurately quantified. Until now, this risk could not be accurately quantified for 
helicopters. NLR has developed a model that quantifies the third-party risk resulting from 
civilian helicopter operations. The model was based on an extensive database of accidents 
worldwide, which NLR has built up over many years. Only data representative of the Dutch 
situation were included in the model. Helicopter accidents in mountainous or desert terrain, for 
example, were excluded. 
NLR’s Air Transport Safety Institute has over 25 years of experience in accident investigation 
and air transport safety research and consultancy. The team consists of highly experienced 
safety experts, covering the whole aviation sector, ranging from academics to safety oversight 
inspectors, from commercial airline pilots to certified instrument procedure designers. Moreover 
advanced safety models and a unique database containing world-wide accident information and 
exposure data (weather, traffic, etc.) are available. 
NLR also analyses aviation incidents and accidents, which are rarely attributable to a single 
cause. Very often, there is a combination of a mechanical defect and human error. It is therefore 
very important that experts from a variety of fields analyse the incident from the point of view 
of aircraft construction, avionics, air traffic control, and risk calculation. The NLR unifies this 
knowledge under its roofs and it is for this reason that so much safety-related research comes 
together at the NLR. 
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Abbreviations 
ADREP Accident/Incident Data Reporting 
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1 Introduction 
The historic and current worldwide helicopter accident rate is (too) high. In 2005 the 
International Helicopter Safety Team (IHST) (Ref. 1) was launched with the objective to reduce 
the helicopter accident rate by 80% worldwide by 2016. The European Helicopter Safety Team 
(EHEST) contributes to this effort, bringing together some 130 participants from around 50 
organisations, including helicopter and component manufacturers, operators, regulators, 
helicopter and pilots associations, research institutes, accident investigation boards and some 
military operators. 
In the Netherlands, there is on average approximately one helicopter accident per year, and the 
trend is not improving. The Dutch National Aerospace Laboratory (NLR) joined EHEST right 
from the beginning, as aviation safety is one of its mainstays. But also other helicopter safety 
related work and research is performed at the NLR in a multi-disciplinary character. In this 
paper the NLR is briefly introduced in chapter 2, whereas other chapters concentrate on various 
aspects of other safety work: chapter 3 is dedicated to the EHEST work, chapter 4 to the third 
party risk model (quantification of risk levels that residents living near heliports are subjected 
to), chapter 5 to safety consultancy work and chapter 6 to accident investigations. The paper 
ends with some concluding remarks. 
 
 
2 The NLR 
The National Aerospace Laboratory (NLR) is the main knowledge enterprise for aerospace 
technology in the Netherlands. NLR carries out commissions for government and corporations, 
both nationally and internationally, and for civil and military aviation. The overarching 
objective is to render aviation safer and more sustainable and efficient. In this way, NLR has 
been making essential contributions to the competitive and innovative capacities of Dutch 
government and industry for more than 90 years. 
A staff of 650 employees develops new technologies, combining disciplines such as aircraft 
engineering, electrical engineering, mathematics, physics, information science, and psychology. 
They use state-of-the-art facilities such as wind tunnels and interconnected aircraft and air-
traffic control radar and tower simulators. 
NLR is targeting the entire lifecycle of aircraft: from research, via design, servicing and 
maintenance to modernisation in both civil and military aviation. But also accident 
investigations form an important part of this business. 
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3 EHEST work 
The European Helicopter Safety Team (EHEST) brings together helicopter manufacturers, 
operators, authorities, helicopter and pilot associations, research institutes, universities, accident 
investigation boards and some military operators from across Europe (totalling around 130 
participants from 50 organisations, from which around 70 are actively involved in the analysis 
and implementation work). EHEST addresses the broad spectrum of helicopter operations 
across Europe, from Commercial Air Transport to General Aviation, and also includes flight 
training activities. 
The process adopted by EHEST is data driven: recommendations are developed on the basis of 
occurrence analyses. The scope of analysis are accidents (definition ICAO Annex 13) reported 
by the accident investigation boards, with date of occurrence starting from the year 2000 
onwards and state of occurrence located in one of the EASA Member States. EHEST is 
committed to ensuring that the analysis carried out in Europe will be compatible with the work 
of the IHST, so that results can be aggregated at worldwide level. So far the countries covered 
by the analysis teams account for more than 90% of the helicopters registered in Europe. 
NLR joined the EHEST initiative right form the very beginning. NLR plays an active role in 
various layers of the organisation: 
• In the EHEST strategic / decision making body. 
• In the European Helicopter Safety Analysis Team (EHSAT) accident analyses. 
• In the European Helicopter Safety Implementation Team (EHSIT) and various of its 
specialist teams. 
Within EHSAT NLR has analysed helicopter incidents and accidents that happened in The 
Netherlands in the years 2000 through 2008. This involved 15 cases (7 related to Civil Air 
Transport, 3 to General Aviation, 2 to Aerial Work, and 3 to State Flight/Police). With such a 
low number of occurrences it is difficult to achieve any significant statistical results, but a few 
facts are notable: 
• The highest ranking factors that played a role in the accident, the so-called Standard Problem 
Statements (SPS’s), are Safety Management and Pilot Judgment & Actions (each about 
25%). 
• By far the highest ranking suggestion for a safety enhancement, the so-called Intervention 
Recommendation (IR), is related to Operations (75%); this is rather trivial, given the large 
percentage of ‘professional’ operations in the Netherlands. 
Solely looking at helicopters that are registered in The Netherlands, there is approximately one 
civil helicopter accident per year in The Netherlands, which sometimes results in fatalities. As is 
the case in the rest of Europe and the world, the trend is not improving, as can be seen in Fig. 1. 
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Fig.1  Absolute number of civil helicopter accidents in the Netherlands (Dutch-registered only) 
 
Even when taking into account the increasing number of helicopters registered in The 
Netherlands, and therefore the increasing number of Flight Hours (FHs), the trend is still not 
good (see Fig. 2). 
 
 
Fig.2  Relative number of civil helicopter accidents per 100.000 FHs in the Netherlands (Dutch-
registered only) 
 
Possible solutions to achieve improvements include strengthening the ‘safety culture’, 
improving training programmes and introducing new technologies. But also communication 
with stakeholders (helicopter users, regulators, accident investigators, etc.) is a critical aspect in 
these efforts. 
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Given these results NLR decided to organize (on a yearly basis) Dutch Helicopter Safety days, 
with the aim of improving helicopter flight safety in The Netherlands. The first one was 
organized in 2010. During the course of the day, presentations were given by a range of experts. 
This was followed by a panel discussion, in which the participants discussed a range of key 
issues. Some 75 visitors attended each of the events in order to exchange knowledge and 
experiences and therefore collectively improve helicopter safety levels. A broad cross-section of 
people who are professionally or privately involved with helicopters attended, including pilots, 
instructors, owners, leasers, maintenance personnel, regulators, ‘operations & safety’ managers 
and (accident) investigators. A good sign, because cooperation is essential for real progress in 
helicopter safety. Some of the possible solutions put forward for improving safety included 
intensifying the ‘culture of safety’, improving training, and introducing new technologies. By 
hosting this safety day, NLR provides a platform for stakeholders to share their knowledge and 
experiences, and thus improve helicopter safety together. Other countries have followed this 
initiative, like France and Belgium. 
 
 
4 Third party risk model for civil helicopters 
The presence of an airport or heliport causes a convergence of air traffic movements over the 
surrounding area (Fig. 3). In addition, it is known that the probability of an accident is relatively 
high during the take-off and landing phase of the flight. The involuntary exposure to this risk of 
air traffic accidents for the population in the vicinity is termed as third party risk. In the 
Netherlands, models for quantifying third party risk have been developed by NLR. The 
assessment of third party risk due to air traffic is a part of the Dutch environmental policy and 
risk calculations have been made for a number of airports. 
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Fig.3  Layout of generic ground-level heliport 
 
The latest addition to the third party risk model is the methodology to calculate the risk due to 
helicopter accidents near helicopter landing sites, specifically that of ground-level heliports and 
helicopter traffic on airports. It provides decision-makers an objective tool to relate traffic 
density to allowable risk levels in the vicinity of the heliport. The model set-up is generic and 
can only differentiate between helicopters with different engine types: single engine piston, 
single engine turbine and multi-engine turbine. 
The helicopter third party risk model is based on the framework of the risk model for the civil 
fixed-wing aircraft. The risk model comprises three model components which answer the 
following questions regarding the risk of an inhabitant living in the vicinity of an airport or a 
heliport (third party risk): 
• What is the chance that a helicopter accident occurs in the vicinity of an airport or heliport? 
(accident probability model). 
• What is the likelihood of an accident occurring on a given location around the airport or the 
heliport (accident location model), given that a helicopter accident occurred in the airport / 
heliport surrounding? (accident location model). 
Residential 
area 
Helicopter flight 
path up to 500 ft 
Heliport 
Highway to South 
Circuit: helicopter 
flight path above 
500 ft 
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• What is the consequence of a helicopter accident, given that the helicopter accident occurred 
in the airport/heliport surrounding? (accident consequence model). 
For data selection of the model components, the following definition of a helicopter accident 
was taken into account (based on ICAO Annex 13): 
Every contact with the ground outside the runway or the take-off and landing site, in which: 
1. a person is fatally or non-fatally injured as a result of: 
a) being in the helicopter (helicopter occupants, crew and passenger); 
b) being outside the helicopter (third party) and having direct contact with any part of the 
helicopter, including parts which have become detached from the helicopter (injuries 
self-inflicted or inflicted by other persons are excluded);  or 
2. the helicopter sustains damage, or 
3. the external objects sustain damage. 
4.1 Accident probability model 
The frequency of the occurrence of a helicopter third party accident is described in the 
parameters of the accident probability model. In the derivation of accident probabilities, both 
accidents and exposure data are necessary. Considering the operation, regulations (JAR-OPS 3) 
and helicopter usage, only the data of nineteen West European countries including Scandinavia 
and Switzerland were selected. Furthermore only accidents that occurred within a limited 
distance from the heliport are representative for the initial and final parts of the helicopter flight. 
Excluded are accidents during operations like testing, air shows and aerial work, and accidents 
due to sabotage. In addition, only accidents are selected which are representative for the Dutch 
situation. The helicopter accident data are obtained from the NLR Air Safety Database, which 
includes the data from Airclaims, ICAO ADREP and NTSB. 
Besides accident data, exposure data are also required. Unlike the scheduled, commercial fixed-
wing aircraft operations, a central reporting of helicopter operations does not exist in most 
countries. The number of helicopter flights published by authorities in their statistics or safety 
studies is mostly based on estimates. For this reason, the HeliCAS data was used to convert 
flying hours into number of flights. It is noteworthy that only the exposure data of turbine 
helicopters can be estimated from the HeliCAS data set. To derive the accident probabilities for 
piston engine helicopters the use of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory statistics was 
made. 
The resulting accident probabilities in the risk model differ for helicopter types based on engine 
types (single engine piston, single engine turbine and multi-engine turbine) and flight phases 
(departure and arrival). The single engine piston helicopters are further differentiated for two 
operation types: training and instruction purpose, and others (non-training). 
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4.2 Accident location model 
The accident location model is based on the distribution of accident data obtained for which the 
distances to the helicopter take-off and landing point are included. By applying data-fitting a 
one-dimensional statistical distribution function is derived based on the distances. This 
distribution function is translated into a two-dimensional probability distribution function that is 
tailored to the sector traffic input used in this model.  
Helicopters are capable of operating from a take-off and landing site (almost) in all directions 
due to their unique flying capability. Therefore the traffic to and from the heliport is defined in 
sectors with the take-off and landing point situated in the centre of the circle. For each sector the 
contribution to the location probability is determined by the proportion of helicopter movements 
assigned to that sector.  
 
4.3 Accident consequence model 
The accident consequence model takes into account the accident consequences in terms of 
affected area and fatal injuries. The area affected by an aircraft accident is defined as 
consequence area, whereas the chance on a fatal injury inside the consequence area is defined as 
lethality. 
The consequence area is a model parameter and is a result of statistical analysis of crash area 
data points. By statistical analyses, an empirically determined correlation between consequence 
area and helicopter Maximum Take-Off Weight (MTOW) is obtained for helicopters with an 
MTOW up to 12 tonnes. 
Lethality is defined as the probability of receiving fatal injuries when residing in the 
consequence area of a crash. The third party consists of people that are inadvertently exposed to 
the risk of a helicopter accident and are not involved in its operation. In the risk model, the 
lethality is determined by the relation: the ratio of the total number of fatalities and the number 
of persons present in the crash area. 
In official accident reports, the number of fatally or non-fatally injured persons on the ground is 
given as factual information. However, hardly any information is reported on the number of 
persons that were present inside the helicopter crash area. This number is obtained by using the 
reported number of injured and non-injured persons, and by making assumptions of the number 
of persons in objects like buildings or cars involved in the accident. 
 
4.4 Results 
Fig. 4 shows a typical result of the third party risk model for civil helicopters, based on the 
generic heliport shown in Fig. 3. 
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Fig.4  Individual risk contours of a ground-level heliport: 1⋅10-5/year (red), 1⋅10-6/year (blue) and 
1⋅10-7/year (green) 
 
 
5 Helicopter safety consultancy 
The NLR Air Transport Safety Institute (NLR-ATSI) is the research and consultancy 
organisation of the National Aerospace Laboratory NLR. The institute develops and applies 
world-class knowledge and tools to help sustain and improve air transport safety. The mission 
of the institute is to support stakeholders in air transport to understand and resolve the safety 
implications of the growing demand for efficient and sustainable air transport. 
Helicopter safety related research performed by the institute focuses on flight operational safety 
assessments and safety data analysis. Last year NLR-ATSI performed several exemplary studies 
in these domains. 
 
5.1 Safety on a high level – HEMS operations from hospital rooftop helipads 
For the DEGAS (Dutch Expert Group Aviation Safety) advice to the Dutch Minister of 
Transport NLR-ATSI performed an analysis of accidents with medical helicopter flights. 
Compared to fixed wing operations, HEMS flights have shown a poor safety performance 
during the last 20 years worldwide. In the Netherlands concerns had been raised regarding the 
safety of HEMS operations from hospital rooftop helipads and during darkness. An analysis of 
the influence of the operations from hospital rooftop helipads and lighting conditions on the risk 
of HEMS operations was conducted. In particular the take-off and landing operation on hospital 
rooftop helipads compared to ground based helipads and unprepared sites was analysed as well 
as the influence of light conditions on these operations. 
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From an analysis of 225 HEMS related accidents the following conclusions were drawn: 
• Take-offs and landings on unprepared sites are associated with a higher risk than operations 
on helipads. An analysis of HEMS accidents that occurred in the USA indicate an increase in 
risk by a factor 2.7. 
• HEMS accidents at rooftop helipads are rare and only account for 4.4% of all analysed 
HEMS accidents that occurred worldwide. 
• From HEMS accidents that occurred in the USA it is estimated that the risk of operations on 
rooftop helipads is the same as for operations on level ground helipads. 
• HEMS accidents that occurred in the USA show that for take-offs and landings at 
unprepared sites the risk is about 2.7 times higher in darkness than in daylight conditions. 
For operations at helipads there is no significant difference in risk between operations in 
daylight and darkness. 
Further to these findings NLR-ATSI analysed their applicability to the situation in the 
Netherlands, based on which DEGAS formulated in their advice to the Dutch Minister of 
Transport not to prohibit the use of hospital rooftop helipads as home base location for HEMS 
operations during night. 
 
5.2 Flight Operational Safety Assessment for helicopter approach procedure at Meiringen 
Air Base  
On request of Swiss Air Navigation Services provider Skyguide, the Swiss Air Rescue Service 
REGA and the Swiss Air Force NLR-ATSI performed a Flight Operational Safety Assessment 
(FOSA) of a helicopter approach procedure at Meiringen Air Base. The challenging terrain 
environment did not permit to build a standard approach. The so-called PinS (Point in Space) 
Copter Meiringen 245 procedure, designed by Skyguide, is a Helicopter Approach through Fog 
(HAF) procedure, a RNAV (GNSS) approach procedure to be used by REGA and the Swiss Air 
Force as a cloud breaking procedure to descent though a layer of stratus clouds. The helicopter 
enters the HAF procedure in VMC above the cloud layer and inside the control region of 
Meiringen AB. The descent is then made under IFR (single pilot), with lateral guidance through 
the helicopter EFIS/FMS and indicated barometric altitude, towards a point in space (PinS). 
When arriving at the PinS and VMC is restored, the IFR procedure is cancelled and the 
helicopter proceeds VFR to Interlaken hospital. When at the PinS VMC is not reached an IFR 
missed approach procedure is carried out.  
In order to ensure sufficient obstacle clearance throughout the procedure a number of non-
standard features had to be introduced: 
• The descent gradient of the final approach segment exceeds the recommended (10%) and 
maximum (13.2%) specified values in the PANS-OPS. 
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• A 15 degrees turn is constructed in the final approach segment, where standard only a 
straight-in segment is allowed. 
• The missed approach segment after passing the PinS is constructed as an approach segment, 
with an associated 0.3 NM RNP instead of a 1 NM RNP which is normally associated with a 
missed approach segment. 
• The approach segment after the PinS is a climbing segment. 
• The approach segment after the PinS contains a 57 degrees turn. 
For the FOSA a hazard assessment has been performed, which addresses those flight 
operational hazards that are introduced by the operation of the procedure. In addition to the 
hazards analysis safety criteria have been defined, specifying the acceptable level of safety of 
the procedure. 
It was found that none of the hazards show a risk level that exceeds the specified acceptable 
level of safety (based on ICAO PBN manual and CS-25). It was therefore concluded that the 
risk of all identified hazards was acceptable. 
 
5.3 Flight Operational Safety Assessment of offshore platform operations after realisation 
of a nearby wind turbine field 
On request of the Dutch Government NLR-ATSI has performed a FOSA of the Airborne Radar 
Approach (ARA) to and Departure from the Q01-HELM-A offshore platform after realisation of 
the Helmveld wind turbine field. EASA document AMC 20-26 and FOSA guidance material of 
Eurocontrol is used as guidance material, as the execution of a FOSA for these approach and 
departure procedures was not obligatory. 
The FOSA executed consisted of the following steps: 
• Description of the operation and the circumstances for which the FOSA will be executed 
(system definition). 
• Determination of the safety criteria relevant for the operation under investigation; the safety 
criterion used is the one formulated in ICAO’s Performance Based Manual: “The risk of a 
collision, with the ground, obstacles or other aircraft, should be smaller than 10-7”. The 
hazard classification table known from CS-25 is adjusted to this criterion. 
• Execution of a hazard analysis (identification of hazards; determination of the severity and 
likelihood). 
• Comparison of the risks related to the identified hazards and the safety criteria determined. 
• Investigation of possible mitigating measures for those hazards with a too high risk. 
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The result of the FOSA was the identification of 4 hazards with an unacceptable high level of 
risk. To reduce the level of risk related to these hazards mitigating measures were suggested of 
which the most important one was an adjustment of the size of the Helmveld wind turbine field. 
 
 
6 Helicopter accident investigation 
NLR also analyses aviation incidents and accidents. In most cases there is not a single cause, 
but a combination of mechanical defects and/or human error. Therefore experts from various 
expertises analyse the incident or accident in detail. A recent example is the failure analysis of 
an APU driven gear in a Boeing Apache AH-64D helicopter accessory gearbox. 
 
6.1. Problem description 
In October 2010 a failure occurred in the accessory gearbox (AGB) of an AH-64D helicopter of 
the Royal Netherlands Air Force. The gear that is connected to the auxiliary power unit APU 
drive shaft was found to be severely damaged, and NLR was requested to provide assistance in 
the investigation into the root cause of this failure (Ref. 2). 
 
6.2. Transmission – general 
The transmission of the Apache helicopter takes input power from the two T700 engines, 
reduces the speed of rotation, and transfers the power to the main rotor shaft, accessory gearbox, 
and tail rotor assembly. The turbine output shafts from the T700 engines rotate at 20,900 rpm. 
This is reduced in the gearbox so that the main rotor turns at about 300 rpm. This is a total gear 
reduction of about 70:1 (Ref. 3). 
 
6.3. Failed gearbox 
The investigated accessory gearbox is integrated with the main transmission (Fig. 5). The 
incident occurred during the power-on phase of a 250 hours inspection. 
 
  
NLR-TP-2012-412 
  
 16 
 
  
Fig.5  Cutaway view of the AH-64D transmission housing with the affected gear and shaft 
indicated in blue 
 
After 15 minutes of APU run time a loud rumble was noticed and a number of warnings on the 
flight deck occurred. Finally the APU stopped after approximately one second and a severely 
deformed spline that connects the APU shaft to the accessory gearbox (Fig. 6) was found. This 
spline was torqued by about 35°. 
 
 
Fig.6  Deformed spline  
 
APU shaft 
Affected 
gear 
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In addition, the freewheel in the AGB could be rotated in both directions. During normal 
operation this freewheel can only be rotated in clockwise direction. The gear (denoted as “gear 
1”) that directly connects to the APU through the deformed spline was found to be severely 
damaged (Fig. 7). A significant part of the gear had separated, and the teeth on the gear part that 
was still attached to the shaft were all missing. Those on the separated part looked quite intact. 
The adjacent gear was moderately damaged. 
The main transmission has been in service for 1,747 flight hours. A history check of the drive 
system has indicated that an overtorque of 123 % had occurred in March, 2010. The reported 
overtorque likely did not affect gear 1, since in-flight the freewheel disengages the APU drive 
shaft and the gear loading is very low. 
 
6.4. Failure analysis results and conclusion 
After detailed observations with an optical stereomicroscope (up to a magnification of 40×) and 
two scanning Electron Microscopes it was concluded that the gear has failed in fatigue. Micro- 
and macro-features were observed on the fracture surfaces. A 75 mm long fatigue crack 
developed and grew before final failure (Fig. 7). 
 
 
Fig.7  Gear 1 fracture surface; the blue arrow marks the area with fatigue indications and the 
white arrow indicates the direction of rotation (note missing teeth) 
 
The presence of small cracks at some of the root fillets of the separated gear part suggests 
‘natural fatigue’, although it cannot be excluded that these cracks have developed under high 
fluctuating loads induced during the failure process. 
The failed gear driven by the APU is regarded as a non-flight critical part, since in-flight the 
freewheel disengages the APU drive shaft and the gear loading is very low. Remedial actions 
were limited to extra inspections for the ‘high time’ transmissions. 
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7 Concluding remarks 
The National Aerospace Laboratory (NLR) is the main knowledge enterprise for aerospace 
technology in the Netherlands. NLR carries out commissions for government and corporations, 
both nationally and internationally, and for civil and military aviation. The overarching 
objective is to render aviation safer and more sustainable and efficient. In this way, NLR has 
been making essential contributions to the competitive and innovative capacities of Dutch 
government and industry for more than 90 years. 
In the Netherlands, there is approximately one civil helicopter accident per year, which 
sometimes results in fatalities. In order to improve and promote helicopter safety in the 
Netherlands, NLR plays an active role in the international helicopter safety initiative and has 
also initiated the so-called annual Dutch helicopter safety days. 
To assess the risk of helicopter accidents for the population in the vicinity of inland heliports a 
so-called third party risk model was developed. The model is more generic than aimed for due 
to a lack of basic data over a significant time period. An improvement can only be obtained with 
the availability of more and improved accident and exposure data. 
NLR’s Air Transport Safety Institute develops and applies world-class knowledge and tools to 
help sustain and improve air transport safety. Helicopter safety related research focuses on flight 
operational safety assessments and safety data analysis. Advanced safety models and a unique 
database containing world-wide accident information and exposure data (weather, traffic, etc.) 
are available. 
NLR also analyses aviation incidents and accidents, which are rarely attributable to a single 
cause. Very often, there is a combination of mechanical defects and human error. Experts from a 
variety of disciplines analyse the accident or incident from the point of view of aircraft 
construction, avionics, air traffic control, and risk calculation. 
NLR unifies multi-disciplinary knowledge under its roofs and it is for this reason that so much 
safety-related research comes together at the NLR. 
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